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During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the emergence of 
transnational communication flows and the rise of digital technolo-
gies have drawn the attention of a large community of social scien-
tists in the field of sociology, cultural studies, and politics. Yet the 
sociological and political issues relating to the emergence of digital 
devices have often been categorically distinguished. On one hand, 
political sciences and researchers in the field of public administration 
mainly focus on the application of digital ICTs to increase political 
engagement and implement a participative democracy. Conse-
quently, political approaches to digital communication devices 
stimulated a broad range of studies on e-governance, e-voting, cyber 
activism, and online campaigning. On the other hand, sociology and 
cultural studies tend to focus on the emergence of new transnational 
and diffuse communities for which social media enable to share and 
experience new social identities. Although some attempts have been 
made to understand the correlation between the cultural and political 
practices of the digital era, these theories need to be merged to ad-
dress the influence of today’s technological environment on the pub-
lic sphere. 
This article reviews Habermas’ theory of public sphere in the 
context of the digital era, and identifies the parameters likely to in-
eSharp                                                                           Issue 20: New Horizons 
 2 
fluence the way consumers and citizens from the twenty-first-
century express their subjectivities and shape their political reality. It 
considers the latest criticism towards virtual public spaces from the 
perspective of the emergence of publicity and public opinion in the 
context of the eighteenth century, and highlights the similarities be-
tween this historical environment and the digital revolution. In the 
first place, it will discuss the idea of technological determinism and 
present one aspect of the critique against connective culture, according 
to which online social interactions are conditioned and limited by 
the technological design of new communication devices. Simultane-
ously, it will envisage the impact of economic interests in the emer-
gence of a digital public sphere and demonstrate that Habermas rec-
ognized the positive influence of mercantilist motivations over the de-
mocratizing society of the eighteenth century. Additionally, this pa-
per will address the argument according to which the digital era af-
fects the quality of public discourses by empowering amateurs with 
the same legitimacy as traditional leaders, professionals, and experts. 
This will underline a major distinction between the normative public 
sphere and today’s connective culture, which lies in the fact that eve-
ryone is now likely to contribute to public discourses. Finally, this 
article will present alternative views regarding the need of technol-
ogy’s users to express their subjectivities. Considering the latest re-
search in the field of cyber-activism, it will emphasize the fact that 
online social interactions increase the attractiveness of collaborative 
projects and political engagement by providing users with the oppor-
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Technological determinism in the digital era 
One of the most recurrent debates in the field of media studies re-
gards the hegemony of corporate media and their cultural influence 
on global audiences. In the context of mainstream media, this ques-
tion has been significantly influenced by the earliest works of the 
School of Frankfurt, like the ones of Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer on cultural industry (1947), or Walter Benjamin on the 
mechanical reproduction of art (1968). This school of thought introduced 
a critical approach named the cultural imperialism thesis (Chalaby 
2007, p.64), which regarded international communication flows as a 
manifestation of global news corporations' power. According to this 
paradigm of imperialism, mainstream media maintain an impartial 
power over the dissemination of cultural and political discourses. Yet 
the emergence of the internet and social media provided information 
consumers with the opportunity to become information producers and 
to shape their cultural environment. This generated new perspectives 
on the question of cultural imperialism and led social scientists like 
Henry Jenkins (2006) to think that the digital revolution empowers 
citizens with more freedom of expression and more influence on 
their cultural and political environment. On the other hand, some 
theories (Van Dijck 2013) argue that digital collaborative media are 
also driven by economic interests, which affects the quality of online 
social interactions. Additionally, aside from the corporate interests 
likely to affect future sociological patterns, online interactions are 
potentially shaped by technological infrastructures. This suggests that, 
unlike the traditional public sphere, new forms of public deliberation 
might be subjected to technological determinism. Beyond the latest 
research on the question of technological determinism (Turkle 
2012), Bourdieu analysed the application of communication tech-
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nologies such as photography (1965) and television (1996) before the 
emergence of the internet. According to Bourdieu, such technologi-
cal devices are generally applied to perform instinctive sociological 
practices that have been inherited by the members of a specific cul-
ture or social class over time and history. In Bourdieusian terms, this 
phenomenon corresponds to the concept of habitus (Bourdieu 1993), 
which reflects individuals' belonging to socio-economic environment 
and leads to the reproduction of power relationships through genera-
tions. In fact, the application of information and communication 
technologies can be interpreted as a manifestation of a social habitus 
and is, therefore, mainly conditioned by sociological parameters. 
According to Jonathan Sterne (2003), Bourdieu’s theory supposes 
that a medium is hardly employed to fulfil one specific duty or social 
practice, despite its technical characteristics. In other words, users, 
just like engineers, assign a role to the technology in question: 
We can see this in Bourdieu’s approach to photography: 
technology is not simply a ‘thing’ that fills a predeter-
mined social purpose. Technologies are socially shaped 
along with their meanings, functions, domains and use. 
Thus, they cannot come into existence simply to fill a 
pre-existing role, since the role itself is co-created with 
the technology by its makers and users. More import-
antly, this role is not a static function but something that 
can change over time for groups of people. (Sterne 2003, 
p. 373) 
Such hypothesis prompts the idea that users are free to construct 
their own social reality online. As such, it supports Henry Jenkins' 
technological optimism as well as his thesis on participatory culture 
(2006). Yet the prominence of connective technologies in postmod-
ern societies is considered  a threat to individual freedom of speech, 
as well as to the transparency of public discourses. 
eSharp                                                                           Issue 20: New Horizons 
 5 
In her study on the culture of connectivity, José Van Dijck 
(2013) precisely argues that freedom of expression is dependent on 
the way social platforms are designed. As a matter of fact, content 
providers such as YouTube, Facebook, My Space, and Twitter gen-
erated new forms of social practice for which they became exclusive 
providers. Furthermore, such platforms have an unilateral control 
over the technological applications offered by social media. In that 
sense, they modify the founding characteristics of social interactions: 
Companies tend to stress the first meaning (human con-
nectedness) and minimize the second meaning (auto-
mated connectivity). […] however, “making the web 
social” in reality means “making sociability technical”. 
Sociality coded by technology renders people’s activities 
formal, manageable, and manipulated, enabling platforms 
to engineer the sociability in people’s everyday routines. 
On the basis of detailed and intimate knowledge of peo-
ple’s desires and likes, platforms develop tools to create 
and steer specific needs. (Van Dijck 2013, p.12) 
Admittedly, the fact that consumers co-produce online information 
suggests they contribute to shape media content. However, they do 
not control the infrastructure through which online social practices 
take place. Rethinking cultural and media studies over the light of 
the digital era requires differentiating the medium (technology) from 
the media (mediated social practices). Supposedly, if online social 
practices are mostly determined by their technological infrastructure, 
they do not give users the opportunity to perform their social reality. 
In the opposite way, such social dynamics could only be artificial and 
limited by the technological facilities available. Foremost, Van Dijck 
argues that the way social platforms are designed is conditioned by 
economic interests and intends to ensure that a large number of users 
provide content, creating opportunities for commercial transactions. 
From this perspective, economic parameters are most likely to affect 
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the quality of social interactions as well as citizens’ ability to debate 
rationally on public matters. Not only does this criticism echo the 
traditional debate on cultural imperialism, but it also emphasises cer-
tain similarities between the Habermasian bourgeois public sphere 
and the culture of connectivity. 
Reviewing Habermas’ public sphere 
The historical context in which Habermas describes the emergence 
of the bourgeois public sphere helps distinguish the characteristics of 
public opinion shaped by mainstream and digital media. First of all, it 
is important to recall that, to a certain extent, the normative public 
sphere can be considered as an elitist process, through which highly 
educated social classes from the eighteenth century and beginning of 
the nineteenth century in France, Germany, or Great Britain, gained 
leadership and political influence. Indeed, leading public opinion by 
becoming a public figure was not only the privilege of the intellec-
tual elite, but also a groundbreaking process for which most people 
could hardly understand the cultural and political outcome. Indeed, 
Habermas (1962) demonstrates that publicity and public opinion 
themselves progressively emanated from the profusion of intellectual 
circles sharing their taste for arts and their ideological views in salons, 
coffee houses, and secret societies. 
Simultaneously, the evolution of the press gave the oppor-
tunity for intellectual leaders to be heard by a broader range of the 
population. From this perspective, the revolutionising public sphere 
of the eighteenth century certainly democratised rational thinking 
and conveyed the legacy of the Enlightenment. However, Habermas 
emphasises the fact that this democratising process was partly moti-
vated by the need of bourgeois elites to gain political power and lib-
eralise markets. As a matter of fact, by attributing the rise of a public 
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opinion to the emergence of capitalism, Habermas recognises the 
positive side effects of liberalism and underlines the fact that bour-
geois societies of the eighteenth century promoted rational criticism 
among a broader population. Furthermore, he demonstrates that 
publicity instituted the notion of common good and stimulated the 
engagement of individuals for common interest: 
A few years before the French Revolution, the condi-
tions in Prussia looked like a static model of a situation 
that in France and especially in Great Britain had become 
fluid at the beginning of the century. The inhibited 
judgments were called "public" in view of a public 
sphere that without question had counted as a sphere of 
public authority, but was now casting itself loose as a fo-
rum in which the private people, come together to form 
a public, readied themselves to compel public authority 
to legitimate itself before public opinion. The publicum 
developed into the public, the subjectum into the [reason-
ing] subject […]. (Habermas 1962: p. 25-26) 
In this regard, the notions of publicity - galvanised by the bourgeois 
public sphere - and citizenship should be considered as indivisible in 
the context of our postmodern democracies. 
This aspect of Habermas’ theory partly explains why his work 
diverges from the earliest work of Frankfurt School. The develop-
ment of bourgeois intellectual circles appeared as an experience of 
the democratic process among members of the educated elite, which 
foreshadowed the French Revolution.  Acknowledging that the 
bourgeois public sphere generated the social capital and the criticism 
necessary to the establishment of a democracy, Habermas supposes 
that an efficient public debate should be led by a community of 
philosophical leaders, experts, and social thinkers. Admittedly, the 
fact that this community of intellectual leaders improves public de-
liberation does not depend on its economic privileges. However, 
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such community might be keener to gain legitimacy and stimulate 
debates on public matters as long as this will ensure economic or 
political power. From this point of view, one can easily argue that 
preserving freedom of speech or liberalising social interactions is cor-
related with the liberalisation of markets. This implies that economic 
interests are not affecting the quality of public discourses in terms of 
diversity and rationality. Quite the opposite, economic motivations 
ensure the sustainability and the expansion of the public sphere. 
Moreover, the concern of private economic interests encourages the 
expression of individuals' subjectivity in the field of arts, literature, 
theatre or popular culture: 
Like the concert and the theater, museums institutional-
ized the lay judgment on art: discussion became the me-
dium through which people appropriated art. The in-
numerable pamphlets criticizing or defending the leading 
theory of art built on the discussions of the salons and re-
acted back on them - art criticism as conversation. Thus, 
in the first half of the eighteenth century the amateurs 
éclairés formed the inner circle of the new art public. 
(Habermas 1962, p. 40) 
Yet according to the normative public sphere, this phenom-
enon contributed to build the legitimacy of individual citizens as 
autonomous thinkers able to argue, justify their views, and shape 
their political environment. The literature of the Enlightenment evi-
dences the exclusivity of the bourgeoisie in the process of shaping 
public opinion. Voltaire, in his Letters Concerning the English Nation 
(1734), claims that a happy and peaceful society is a world of luxury 
that promotes the arts, as the flourishing of the arts increases intellec-
tual capital. Yet this ideal can only be achieved when the primary 
material needs have been satisfied. Consequently, according to Vol-
taire, wealth and commercial transactions ensure social happiness. 
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Trade enriches citizens and guarantees their freedom by providing 
them with economic independence. Inversely, individual freedom 
stimulates commercial transactions and assures economic growth. 
According to Voltaire (1734), English society perfectly illustrates the 
beneficial effects of economic profit, such as the fact that financial 
interactions improves relationships between religious communities. 
Take a view of the Royal Exchange in London, a place 
more venerable than many courts of justice, where the 
representatives of all nations meet for the benefit of 
mankind. There the Jew, the Mahometan, and the 
Christian transact business together, as though they were 
all of the same religion, and give the name of Infidels to 
none but bankrupts ; there the Presbyterian confides in 
the Anabaptist, and the Churchman depends upon the 
Quaker’s word. (Voltaire 1734, p.36) 
Voltaire expresses similar views in is famous poem Le Mondain, 
where he praises the libertine culture of a new wealthy middle class 
driven by material plaesures. He opposes the libertinism of his time 
to religious morals, and describes this philosophical transition as an 
ideological progress. This aspect of the Enlightenment undeniably 
illustrates the causality between ecnomonic privileges and the emer-
gence of a rational public sphere in which individuals' subjective 
views had the opportunity to be expressed. Besides, it is worth noti-
cing that Voltaire is in line with Adam Smith (1776) in suggesting 
that individual material motivations indirectly promote society's eco-
nomic interests. In this regard, like Adorno and Hochmeiker in the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), one could easily argue that some of 
the great philosophers of the eighteenth century helped (alt: contri-
buted to the establishement of the ideals...) to establish the ideals and 
principles of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, from a Haberma-
sian perspective, this suggests that - in both cultural and political 
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contexts - liberalism originally improved major components of de-
mocracy, such as rational thinking, social capital, and freedom of 
expression. Therefore, it is surprising to notice that recent critiques 
of digital culture tend to perceive economic interests as a threat to 
freedom of expression and natural social interactions. 
From the leadership of an intellectual elite to the re-
cognition of amateurs 
One of the reasons why social scientists distinguish virtual envi-
ronments from the normative public sphere is because digital tech-
nologies provide everyone with the opportunity to contribute to 
public discourses. In other words, the factors likely to affect the ra-
tionality of social interactions, as well as the sustainability of public 
opinion in a digital world, might reside in the fact that the online 
public sphere provides every citizen with the opportunity to express 
himself publicly. This is one of the most significant differences be-
tween Habermas' model of a bourgeois public sphere and the online 
public spaces of the twenty-first century. 
According to social theorists such as Patrice Flichy (2010) and 
Dominique Cardon (2010), online discourses are considerably af-
fected by a lack of rational thinking and effective deliberation. In 
their recent essays on online social practices, the two sociologists 
develop an analysis similar to Van Dijck's criticism, claiming that 
social media platforms simplify discourses and reduce the robustness 
of public opinion. 
Observing how people live and share their domains of inter-
est in the digital era, Patrice Flichy (2010) considers three fields of 
activity in which internet users progressively gain credibility. He 
introduces the idea that the Web 2.0 provides amateurs with the 
opportunity to contribute to their themes of interest, confront differ-
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ent opinions, and find an audience. In that sense, amateurs acquire an 
influence that, not  so long ago, was the exclusive privilege of pro-
fessionals and experts. According to Flichy, this social recognition of 
amateurs is particularly significant in the field of arts, popular culture, 
science, and politics. 
In the case of politics, this democratisation of the debate af-
fects the fundamental parameters of the public sphere, because blog-
gers and internet users are not subjected to any form of control or 
gatekeeping. Their publications are likely to be less reliable, and their 
arguments lack rationality. Therefore this online form of public 
sphere fails at confronting and discussing political issues in an organ-
ised and critical way. However, the author admits that the advantage 
of online deliberation is that a wider range of opinions can be ex-
pressed, and that the quality of the public sphere might not be af-
fected as long as the debate is moderated by professionals of public 
expression: 
The autonomous and competent amateur, who might 
not be involved in the traditional political circle, is ready 
to explore new forms of public debate. This online de-
liberative democracy works provided that formalised 
rules are respected and accepted by the participants and 
reminded by moderators. (2010, p. 53) 
From another perspective, Flichy underlines the fact that the quality 
of an online public sphere is subject to the diversity of participants 
contributing to the debate. Yet the fact that the internet tends to 
target very specific audiences leads citizens to express their different 
opinions in a very diffuse way, which makes the range of political 
views harder to identify. Unlike the Habermasian public sphere, the 
online public space cannot be localised. Indeed, it is unlikely that 
different ideologies are confronted on the same platform and internet 
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users have the tendency to visit websites or connect with networks 
that promote their own opinions. Therefore, these diversified and 
diffuse public spaces are not led to face opposite views and improve 
their arguments. 
Likewise, Flichy observes that online political engagement 
tends to be less sustainable and does not gather the same communi-
ties of citizens sharing similar ideological views. He argues that the 
digital era has transformed the traditional forms of political networks 
that were active in the second part of the twentieth century. 
Whereas citizens engaged themselves in the long run to promote a 
party or an ideology, the amateurs of the digital era operate from 
time to time to support specific political projects in order to preserve 
their individual interests. Furthermore, as political audiences are not 
as strictly structured as before, individuals are not exclusively associ-
ated to one particular organisation and may be involved in very dif-
ferent causes. According to Flichy, this is precisely where the para-
dox of amateur engagement in politics lies: their partnership to po-
litical networks, which brings them to seek common good, is in fact 
subjected to personnel motivations. 
Flichy explains this phenomenon by the fact that the boun-
dary between private and public space is hard to define. Initially citi-
zens collect information and exchange their personnel experiences. 
In a second phase, other internet users are able to structure this in-
formation in a co-ordinated and sometimes institutionalised network 
to promote political changes. This is how individuals progressively 
contribute to large social movements, without understanding their 
strategic dimension neither to anticipate their outcome. 
Therefore, it appears that the latest criticisms against the 
credibility and legitimacy of amateurs in an interactive and participa-
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tory cyberspace also emphasises the fact that digital communication 
devices tend to ease the boundary between public and private iden-
tity. Social media leads individuals to share and develop their per-
sonal identity publically. Simultaneously, an individual’s social life is 
considerably shaped and determined by the way they manage their 
online public image. 
Incorporating individualities in the political message 
These new social dynamics inevitably impact the way citizens 
become politically involved, and the way individuals negotiate their 
views on public matters to produce some form of public opinion. On 
one hand, the fact that individual identities become more visible 
within social groups stimulates political engagement, as it provides 
the satisfaction of being part of an ideological movement whilst 
freely expressing one's personality. Recent studies on cyber-
activism demonstrated that, similarly to any form of online social 
activity, activist movements emerging on social media prove to be 
extremely flexible and constantly evolve with members' 
contributions. The potential impact of every single contributor 
increases the attractiveness of this new form of political action – 
connective action – given that individuality can be expressed within 
the global social structure. 
As they draw the distinction between militant organisations 
and online activism, Bennett & Segerberg (2011) define online 
activism and connective action as a more strategic way to 
personalize the message of protesters. They argue with a large 
majority of social scientists on the fact that, as opposed to traditional 
forms of collective actions, connective networks have a particularly 
rapid expansion, and gather wide and diversified audiences. Yet one 
of the most interesting and advantageous characteristics of cyber-
activism is its ability to reinforce an individual’s engagement to the 
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cause, by giving every single member the opportunity to contribute 
to its global message. Given that individuals can personalize the 
object of common interest, the action becomes more fluid and is 
more likely to appeal to members from different social and cultural 
backgrounds. Admittedly, this also explains why the evolution of 
connective actions is less predictable. 
Interestingly, Bennett & Segerberg associate two more 
qualities to connective networks that seem to contradict some of the 
recent theories on social media. Firstly, they claim that connective 
networks tend to be less emotional than traditional forms of 
collective action, as the latter generates more violent 
demonstrations. This position contrasts with the theory upheld by 
Flichy (2010) and Cardon (2010), according to which individuals’ 
involvement in the public sphere affects the rationality of public 
debates, by giving the opportunity to non-professionals to express 
their subjective opinions. 
Secondly, their research on cyber-activism introduces the idea 
that activist networks can enhance the sustainability of collective 
actions, as they meet the need underlined by Mancur Olson (1965) 
to stimulate individuals’ interest in a common cause. Indeed, Olson 
considerably influenced the Resource Mobilization Theory when he 
demonstrated that some individual free-riders would not take part in 
mobilizations as long as they could benefit from others engagement 
for common good. Bennett and Segerberg argue that the 
interactivity of digital media enables activist organisations to raise 
the attention of these potential members, by giving them the 
opportunity to personalize the action. Furthermore, the temporal and 
territorial flexibility of these networks releases the movement from 
its local infrastructures and enables it to be constantly active and 
independent from its individual members: 
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 Such networks are flexible organizations in themselves, 
often enabling coordinated adjustments and rapid action 
aimed at moving political targets, even crossing geo-
graphic and temporal boundaries in the process. As Diani 
(2011) argues, networks are not just precursors or build-
ing blocks of collective action, they are in themselves or-
ganizational structures that can transcend the elemental 
units of organizations and individuals. (Bennett and 
Segerberg 2011, p.24) 
The latest findings in the field of cyber-activism clearly indicates that, 
as with the normative public sphere of the eighteenth century, the 
digital era provides individuals with the opportunity to express their 
subjectivity, which stimulates their political engagement. Whereas 
some social theorists (Cardon 2010; Flichy 2010) perceive this new 
rise of subjectivity as an obstacle to rational thinking, studies on on-
line activism demonstrate that some other characteristics of the nor-
mative public sphere – like freedom of expression – might actually 
be improved by digital communication technologies. However, 
while describing online networks as an emancipating public space for 
activists and militants, Bennett & Segerberg suggest that these par-
ticipative organisations could be more sustainable and efficient. 
Nevertheless, this potential sustainability and efficiency needs to be 
assessed in accordance with the criteria specifically relating to the 
emerging connective culture, as opposed to the framework of tradi-
tional forms of political action. 
The new intellectual leaders of the public sphere 
Among the few cases for which connective interactions have proved 
to be politically efficient, it is worth examining the Tunisian and 
Egyptian 2011 protests. Indeed, it has been argued that social media 
significantly contributed to the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolutions (Breuer 2012). Not only did digital technologies enable 
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the circumvention of censorship imposed by former governments to 
inform local populations, they also raised the attention of an interna-
tional audience. Yet the efficiency of the online public debate in 
Tunisia and Egypt potentially relies on the sociological characteristics 
of internet users in the Middle East. In fact, due to the lack of eco-
nomic and technological recourses, the majority of the Tunisian and 
Egyptian populations have no regular access to digital devices 
(Meraz& Papacharissi 2013). According to Dubai School of Gov-
ernment (2011), in December 2010, Tunisia was among the emerg-
ing countries in terms of Facebook penetration, with 17.55% of the 
population having access to this social platform. Egypt was still con-
sidered as one of the developing users with only 5.49% of the popu-
lation. Comparatively, Facebook penetration reached 46.22% in 
USA and 45.92% in UK. Given the small proportion of citizens ac-
cessing social media, it is very unlikely that the population of internet 
users truly reflects the sociological diversity of the entire population. 
Moreover, statistics show that the population of internet and social 
media users fails at representing all generations:  
The demographic breakdown of Facebook users indi-
cates that they are a youthful group. Youth (between the 
ages of 15 and 29) make up 75% of Facebook users in 
the Arab region. [...] Moreover, the percentage of Arab 
Facebook users who are between 15 and 29 years of age 
is significantly higher than the proportion of youth (15-
29) in general in the Arab world (roughly 40% of 15 
year-olds and above). (Salem & Mourtada 2011, pp.7-8) 
This suggests that internet and social media users actively contribut-
ing to online public deliberation   constitute an elite of young and 
educated citizens. In this regard, one could argue that the Tunisian 
and Egyptian intellectual middle class is promoting a democratic and 
collaborative culture online, just like the bourgeoisie of the eight-
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eenth century initiated a critique of the ancien régime. This hypothesis 
has been confirmed by the statistical data collected from the Egyptian 
e-government, after the 2012 Referendum on the Egyptian Consti-
tution. 
In August 2012, the Sharek initiative was launched on the 
Egyptian e-government's portal. This interactive platform was de-
signed to provide citizens with the opportunity to discuss the project 
of the new constitution. The drafts elaborated by the constituent 
assembly have been uploaded online, allowing users to comment and 
rank every single article. After the referendum, the statistics of the 
Sharek project indicated that the majority of participants were male 
aged between 24 and 34. Only 14% of participants were females. 
The majority of participants connected in Egypt were located in the 
urban areas of Cairo and Alexandria. Apart from Egypt, many par-
ticipants have been localised in Kuwait, UAE and Saudi Arabia as 
well as in USA, where a significant proportion of the intellectual 
Egyptian diasporas live. This suggests that, despite the fact that digital 
divide decreases very quickly in the Middle East; the educated mid-
dle class is still leading the online public debate. Accordingly, digital 
public discourses in Tunisia and Egypt are more likely to match the 
definition of the bourgeois public sphere. In that sense, there are 
potentially more effective when it comes to produce an impartial, 
critical and rational public debate. However, one could argue that, 
just like the bourgeois public sphere, these virtual environments tend 
to be more elitist and thus less democratic. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, rediscovering Habermas’ public sphere from the per-
spective of today’s virtual public spaces underlines the similarities 
between the digital era and the historical context of the eighteenth 
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century. First of all, the economic parameters that are likely to im-
pact the technological design of today’s communication devices are 
comparable to the commercial and political interests that indirectly 
motivated the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere. The second 
similitude between the normative and virtual public sphere resides in 
the emancipation of individuals’ subjectivities. In the case of the 
twenty-first century connective culture, this phenomenon can be 
interpreted as the rise of amateurism, as everyone is regarded as a 
potential contributor to the collection of public discourses. Whereas 
the expression of individuals’ subjectivities is described by Habermas 
as a beneficial process, given that it stimulates criticism among the 
population, some theories argue that today’s individualities are only 
expressed in a very superficial way, which paradoxically affects the 
process of rational thinking. Furthermore, according to a certain 
criticism, the new boundaries between private and public spaces al-
low subjectivities to be expressed in a less critical way. However, 
from the perspective of online activism, the expression of subjectiv-
ities is regarded as an advantage, given that it enables every single 
member to reflect their own identity in a social movement. Thus, 
similar to the Habermasian public sphere, the connective culture 
renders individuals conscious of their political power, and promotes a 
democratic culture. Yet it is not clear to what extent this form of 
political engagement is sustainable in the context of a representative 
democracy. 
Applying Habermas’ theory to the digital and connective cul-
ture of the twenty-first century shows that one of the most signifi-
cant differences between the emergence of the bourgeois public 
sphere and the liberalisation of online public discourses lies in the 
intellectual leadership. Whereas publicity and public opinion were led 
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by members of the bourgeois elite in the period that preceded the 
French Revolution, every citizen now has access to the public scene. 
Interestingly this is probably the reason why digital technologies ap-
pear to be prominent in democratizing countries, such as Tunisia and 
Egypt, where social media contributed to the rise a revolution. In-
deed,  the Tunisia and Egypt revolutionary movements proved to be 
led by an elite of young educated activists. In this regard, the histori-
cal changes currently occurring in democratizing societies might be a 
particularly appropriate  reflection of the democratizing culture of 
the eighteenth century. 
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